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LET GO OF YOUR SEXUAL PRIVACY OR BE LET GO?
THE WOE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
By Sofya Bakradze

ABSTRACT

The issue of sexual freedom as a subset of the general right to
privacy, while not novel, is still highly controversial both legally and
socially. The Circuit Courts of Appeals have yet to agree whether
the leading case on the issue, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
affirmatively established the fundamental right to sexual privacy.
The answer to this question means the difference between a world
where off-duty sexual conduct stays private and respected by the
government employers and a world where a public employee can be
terminated without due process for his or her intimate activities.
As a result, public agencies and departments have become a
place of conflicting private rights and public duties, and the resulting
disputes have produced varying results among the jurisdictions.
This Comment focuses on the cases involving law enforcement officers terminated for inappropriate extra-marital conduct, while the underlying argument can be applied to a variety of similar issues that
could fall within the scope of public employment and sexual privacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Issues in employer-employee relationships are ubiquitous and
are something that all encounter one way or another. No matter how
tense your relationship might be with your private employer, however, those working for the government face many unique hurdles,
otherwise unfamiliar to private employees.1
The private employment relationships are presumed to be “at
will” in all U.S. states except Montana, which means that either the
employer or the employee can terminate the relationship at any time
for “any reason, even for no reason, without legal liability attaching.”2 However, when it comes to public employees, the Constitution comes into consideration and guarantees due process protections in cases of adverse employment actions.3 These protections
generally include a hearing, at which the employee may defend himself against the employer’s claims, and impose a duty on the employer to prove that it has a good reason for termination.4
The boundary between private rights and public responsibilities
has grown uncertain under modern American law, creating undeniable tension between an employer’s right to control an employee’s
conduct and the employee’s right to privacy outside of the workplace.5 This Comment addresses how the right to sexual privacy fits
1. Karen S. Johnson, Public Sector Employee Issues, CHRON, (last visited Jan. 20, 2019),
https://work.chron.com/public-sector-employee-issues-18590.html (bringing up issues
that arise as a result of influence of politics and unions, and the demand for accountability
and transparency). See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND Development. ET AL.,
THE WORLD OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, (OECD PUBLISHING 2016),
https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264251854-en (outlining and comparing characteristics
of public employment services in the U.S. and internationally).
2. Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM.
BUS. L.J. 653, 653 (2000). See also James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. &EMP. L. 235, 243-50 (2007) (describing history of “at-will” rule).
3. Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461. See
King v. Alston, 75 F.3d 657, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (clarifying that employees may not be
removed from federal service except for cause or unacceptable performance because they
possess property interest in continued employment); Jason Russel, Government Workers Are
Harder to Fire Than Private Ones, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 25, 2014, 12:40 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/government-workers-are-harder-to-fire-thanprivate-ones.
4. Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461. See also
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PENN. L.R. 1267, 1279-81 (1975) (describing
the necessary elements of due process hearing and the history of their formation).
5. See Nancy E. Smith & Kyle M. Francis, Beyond the Company Town: Employees Right
to Privacy Regarding Off-Duty Conduct, 1994 N.J. LAW 13, 13-15 (1994) (identifying a number
of matters employers have been interfering with, including relationships, health matters,
smoking, as well as the use of lie detector tests). See generally Anna C. Camp, Cutting Cupid
out of the Workplace: The Capacity of Employees’ Constitutional Privacy Rights to Constrain
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into the broader context of public employment, using recent circuit
court split cases as basis for analysis. The factual similarities will illustrate how different interpretations of a fundamental right to sexual privacy led to diametrically opposite outcomes.
Part II of this Comment will describe the relevance of due process in modern jurisprudence and provide background on the creation of a fundamental right to sexual privacy through a series of Supreme Court decisions that culminated with Lawrence v. Texas.6 It
will then proceed to address the circuit split between the Fifth, the
Ninth, and the Tenth Circuits regarding the meaning of Lawrence in
the context of adverse employment actions by public employers
when the employees engaged in off-duty sexual behavior that their
employers deemed undesirable and harmful to the department.7
Part III will analyze the differences in the courts’ reasonings which
led them to reach different results. Part IV will recommend recognition of a fundamental right to sexual privacy by the Supreme Court
and suggest improvements to due process procedures in the context
of public employment.
II. HOW SEXUAL PRIVACY FITS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. The Employer-Employee Relationship in Public Context: Due
Process vs. Code of Conduct
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that the government
cannot take away a citizen’s “life, liberty, or property” without due
process.8 The right to due process exists when the employee has a
property interest in his job, and public employers who deny eligible
employees that due process risk entering into (and potentially losing) a lengthy public lawsuit.9 The government must to provide an
Employers’ Attempts to Limit Off-Duty Intimate Associations, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
427 (2010) (discussing the impact of “no-fraternization” policies on intimate conduct and
employee’s private lives); James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Behavior, 43 GA. L. REV. 133, 136, 140-42 (2008) (highlighting cases concerning online presence, alcohol, smoking, and private relationships).
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 854-856 (9th Cir. 2018) (having a workplace
affair while separated); Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 305-307 (5th Cir. 2017) (living
with a non-spouse while separated); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 765 (10th
Cir. 2008) (having an affair at a conference while pending divorce proceedings).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845846 (1998) (describing due process as a protection against arbitrary and oppressive government action, even when taken to further a legitimate governmental objective).
9. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-578 (1972) (holding that the Due
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employee with advance and proper notice and a fair hearing, at
which the employer must show that it has an appropriate reason for
termination and the employee has a chance to argue that he or she
should remain employed.10
To have a successful due process claim, an employee has to
demonstrate a fundamental liberty interest or be the subject to the
government’s exercise of “power that shocks the conscience.”11
Washington v. Glucksberg12 defined a fundamental right or liberty interest as one that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”13 Fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause require
the highest standard of review, called strict scrutiny, which places a
heavy burden on the government.14 The uncertainty over existence
of a fundamental right to sexual privacy creates ambiguity over the
scope of the employer’s power to regulate intimate off-duty conduct.15
Codes of ethics or morality clauses are contractual ways for employers to exert more control over employees’ on- and off-duty conduct.16 The clauses, for instance, allow employers to discipline the
Process Clause of the Constitution protects public employees from being deprived of a
protected “property interest” in his or her employment which exists when an employee
has a “legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”).
10. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997) (suggesting the necessity of both
pre- and post-termination hearings). See also Friendly, supra note 4 (describing the necessary elements of due process hearing and the history of their formation).
11. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003) (defining it as a deliberate government action that is arbitrary and “unrestrained by the established principles of private
right and disruptive justice.”). See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (explaining that this aspect of substantive due process is concerned with preventing government officials from abusing their power).
12. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
13. See id. at 767-68 (stressing the importance of the historical inquiry) (Concurrence J.
Sutter).
14. See id. at 721-22 (providing that to justify an infringement on a fundamental right
the government must prove a compelling state interest and cite a law or regulation that is
narrowly tailored to that interest – meaning that the limits must present the least possible
infringement upon citizens’ rights). For discussion of rational basis review and rational
basis “with bite” see Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage Restrictions
Under Rational-Basis Review, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 8:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/why-the-court-can-strike-down-marriage-restrictions-under-rational-basis-review/.
15. Daniel Singer, Adverse Actions for Off-Duty Conduct: Why the Federal Circuit’s Approach Infringes Employees’ Privacy Rights, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 169, 170-172 (2010) (discussing
the importance of respecting employee’s privacy and freedom from unreasonable employer intrusions or the imposition of an employer’s subjective moral values on its employees).
16. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (allowing the employers to use contracts to ban the workers from joining class-action lawsuits and to force
them into mandatory individual arbitration in the event of disputes). See also Helaine Olen,
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employees for off-duty conduct that is not necessarily illegal, but
clashes with the business’ interests, even if it infringes certain employees’ rights.17 Government employees are often subject to similar
clauses, which in turn may be subject to constitutional scrutiny on
the basis of scope and vagueness.18
Law enforcement agencies place high importance on the codes
of conduct and ethics.19 Police departments often have rules that authorize removal, suspension, or demotion of an employee for “conduct unbecoming [of] an officer” – the phrase that can be broadly
construed to encompass the types of behavior that could adversely
affect public confidence in law enforcement or cause personal animosity among other employees.20 Whether sexual conduct falls
within the scope of such misconduct is an issue that requires the
courts to reconcile the police officer’s privacy interests against the
The Supreme Court Just Made It Easier on Employers – And Harder on Workers, WASHINGTON
POST (May 21, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2018/05/21/the-supreme-court-just-made-it-easier-on-employers-and-harderon-workers/ (citing an attorney who called this decision a “backdoor to repeal workplace
laws” that drastically tilted the playing field in favor of employers, effectively preventing
employees from seeking recourse in case of a legal dispute).
17. See Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 378 (2003) (citing examples of notorious terminations for off-duty conduct including participating in political protests, partying with exotic dancers, or even
making inappropriate jokes).
18. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (holding that statute or
regulation is void for vagueness if it does not sufficiently identify the conduct that it prohibits). Compare Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the portion
of a police department regulation allowing the department to punish officers who engage
in “conduct unbecoming a member and detrimental to the service” was vague and unenforceable), with Bird v. County of Allen, 639 N.E.2d 320, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1994)
(holding that it was not necessary, under due process principles, for the police disciplinary
rules prohibiting “unbecoming conduct” and “immoral conduct” to be redrafted to include interpretive guidelines).
19. See Pasadena Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Pasadena, 797 P.2d 608, 611 (1990)
(reflecting that “peace officers have been held to a higher standard than other public employees,” because that is essential to “maintain the public’s confidence in its police force.”).
See also Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (recognizing the government
employers’ interest in maintaining a certain degree of control over their employees’ words
and actions).
20. See DIANE C. SHEIRING, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT OR IRREGULARLY AS AMOUNTING TO
“CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER”, JUSTIFYING OFFICER’S DEMOTION OR REMOVAL OR
SUSPENSION FROM DUTY, 9 A.L.R. 4TH 614 (2019) (including adultery, fathering an illegitimate child, participating in prostitution, and encouraging immoral behavior in others in
the scope of fireable misconduct); MARJORIE A. SHIELDS, NONSEXUAL MISCONDUCT OR
IRREGULARITY AS AMOUNTING TO “CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER,” JUSTIFYING
POLICE OFFICER’S DEMOTION OR REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION FROM DUTY, 19 A.L.R. 6TH 217
(2019) (including inefficient fiscal or organizational management, improper recordkeeping, use of excessive force with an arrestee or bystander, false arrest, failure to assist one’s
partner, and neglect of police duties in the scope of fireable conduct).
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government’s interest in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness
of the police department.21
B. The History and Debate Surrounding the Right to Sexual Privacy
The right to sexual privacy, noticeably absent from the Constitution, has been evolving through a series of the Supreme Court decisions that separated constitutionally protected intimacy from procreation, abortion, marriage, and historical and social stigma.22 The
unsettled question, and the focus of this Comment, is whether this
right is fundamental and worthy of due process protections, considering that the Lawrence instructions left some courts unpersuaded on
the issue.23
i.

The Road to Sexual Privacy Through Supreme Court
Decisions

The Supreme Court made multiple attempts at defining rights
associated with privacy and intimacy in a series of decisions. Griswold v. Connecticut24 is a landmark case that overturned Connecticut’s
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives and clearly established
a constitutional right to privacy separate from procreation.25 Seven
years later the Supreme Court expanded the scope of intimate privacy rights to unmarried individuals, thus separating sexual privacy
issues from marriage, in Eisenhardt v. Baird.26 Together, the two opinions recognize that liberty requires a private space where the government cannot intrude, regardless of the alleged governmental objectives.27
The liberal trajectory of the Supreme Court slowed down when
the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hardwick,28 finding no fundamental right to engage in homosexual activity under the Due Process Clause.29 In the Court’s
21. See Sheiring, supra note 20.
22. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
23. See Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After
Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 5 (2004).
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. Id.
26. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (establishing the right of unmarried people to
acquire and use contraception on the same basis as married couples).
27. Herald, supra note 23, at 39.
28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
29. Id. at 191 (1986) (finding no connection between family, marriage, or procreation
and homosexual activity and clearly stating that the Court would not support the
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opinion, the Griswold line of cases simply did not extend the due process protections so far as to protect the intimate decisions made by
the citizens, especially when those decisions involved practices that
went against the society’s moral judgments.30 Bowers was a temporary setback in the otherwise progressive line of cases leading up to
establishing the right to sexual privacy, but even then, Justice
Blackmun’s dissent spoke of the right to privacy and the majority’s
failure to consider the broader principles and the most valued right
“to be left alone.”31
Sixteen years later, Lawrence v. Texas32 “pit[ted] sexual privacy
against the forces of the government”33 and explicitly overturned
Bowers.34 Justice Kennedy’s landmark opinion expressly limited the
government’s authority to interfere with adults’ private sexual activities with consenting adults.35 The Court criticized reliance on tradition and history in the analysis of new fundamental rights and cautioned against solidifying the impact of long-standing biases in
common law.36 However, in the opinion of some scholars and
judges, Justice Kennedy’s language does not create an explicit right;
rather it leaves it open, undefined, and thus open to interpretation.37
Moreover, the opinion does not expressly call for heightened scrutiny, leaving scholars to contemplate the existence of “rationality
with a bite.”38
Despite the uncertainty in terms of granting an explicit right,
proposition that any kind of sexual conduct between consenting adults would be constitutionally insulated from state intrusion).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 428,
478 (1928)) (stressing that the moral judgments that may be natural and familiar cannot be
a valid basis for denying the individuals the right to decide whether to engage in a certain
form of consensual and private intimate activity).
32. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. See Herald, supra note 23, at 2.
34. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
35. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.”).
36. Id. at 567-68. See also Herald, supra note 23, at 9 (noting, however, that the Court
never explicitly mentioned Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and its language that required the right to be deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition).
37. See Katie R. Terpstra, Sexual Privacy in the Modern Era: Lowe v. Swanson, 81 U. CIN.
L. REV 1127, 1129-32 (2013) (highlighting the misunderstanding about the level of judicial
review and explicit fundamental right that led the circuit court to split in construing Lawrence broadly or narrowly).
38. See Yoshino, supra note 14 (describing “the bite” as a half-step between rational
and intermediate review and exploring how different levels of judicial review may influence the analysis and the outcome of the cases).
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Lawrence manages to give power to the value of sexual intimacy
alone, unrelated to procreation, abortion, or stigmatization of certain
conduct.39 The Court clearly established that non-traditional relationships deserve to be protected in the same way that nonprocreative intimate relationships between opposite-sex adult couples are
protected, regardless of their marriage status or intimate preferences.40
These momentous cases posed a “question of whether the Constitution allows the government to bring its handcuffs into the consenting adults’ bedroom.”41 Now, courts are struggling to decide
whether that means that the government is not allowed to trade
those handcuffs for a termination notice.
ii. The Role of Sexual Privacy in Adverse Employment
Actions Against Public Employees
The legal community, including scholars and lower courts, often disagree about the impact Lawrence had on the creation of a fundamental right to sexual privacy.42 The recent circuit split discussed
below addressed the interplay between the fundamental right to sexual privacy and public employment in the narrow context of law enforcement employment.
In the Tenth Circuit, the court refused to identify an all-encompassing right to sexual privacy under the rubric of substantive due
process in Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City.43 The court addressed the reasonability of the oral reprimand issued to a police officer, Johnson,
for her off-duty sexual conduct.44 Johnson, separated but not yet divorced from her husband, had a brief affair with an officer from a
different department at a training seminar.45 The estranged husband
reported the encounter and later added a false accusation of a
39. See Herald, supra note 23, at 29.
40. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: the “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898, 1905 (2004).
41. See Herald, supra note 23, at 3.
42. See Terpstra, supra note 37. Compare Williams v. Morgan 478 F.3d 1316, 1323-1324
(11th Cir. 2007) (upholding the Alabama’s ban on sex-toys because the court did not find
a fundamental right to sexual privacy under Lawrence and affirming public morality as
sufficient rational basis for the statute), with Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2008)
(recognizing a fundamental right to sexual privacy in a post-Lawrence challenge to the
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy).
43. 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008) (asserting that the Supreme Court has made it
clear that not all important, intimate, and personal decisions are protected by substantive
due process).
44. Id. at 772.
45. Id. at 764.
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workplace affair between Chief Seegmiller and Johnson.46 Both
Seegmiller and Johnson received reprimands on the basis of violating
a provision of the code of ethics that cautioned employees against
allowing personal lives to interfere with official duties to avoid the
appearance of impropriety.47 Johnson claimed that the reprimand
caused her to lose her position with the SWAT team and led to her
eventual resignation from employment with the City.48
While the Circuit Court admitted that it did not attempt to dispute a right to be free from governmental interference in matters of
consensual sexual privacy, it declined to interpret Lawrence as establishing a fundamental right or a liberty interest, reducing the Lawrence ruling to a mere instance of application of rational basis review
to the legislation.49 Instead, the opinion relied on the test outlined in
Glucksberg.50 The court found the reprimand to be reasonable under
the rational basis review, and justified the decision by the necessity
of placing higher demands on certain government employees,
“which have no counterpart with respect to the public at large.”51
The next opportunity for a Circuit Court to decide on the meaning of Lawrence under similar circumstances arose in the Fifth Circuit,
in Coker v. Whittington.52 The facts were quite delicate: two sheriff
deputies, both separated, but not yet divorced, moved in with each
others’ soon-to-be-ex-wives.53 Upon finding out about the new living arrangements, the Sheriff placed both deputies on administrative
leave for violating the Sheriff’s Code of Conduct.54 Additionally, the
46. Id.
47. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 765 (quoting the provision that required the officers to “keep
[their] private life unsullied as an example to all and [to] behave in a manner that does not
bring discredit to [the officer] or [the] agency.”)
48. Id.
49. Id. at 771 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
50. Id. at 770 (finding that Johnson failed to assert a proper due process claim because
she could not describe that the right to “engage in a private act of consensual sex” narrowly
enough and did not assert that it was deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition).
51. Id. at 772 (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976)) (finding that the regulation that strictly governed the hair grooming standard for male members of the police
force did not violate any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because the regulation’s
goal to make the officers readily recognized in public was rationally justified). See also Lou
Reiter, Conduct Unbecoming – Sex, Videotapes, the Internet and Police Misconduct, PUBLIC
AGENCY TRAINING COUNCIL (last visited Sept. 10, 2019), http://patc.com/weeklyarticles/conduct-unbecoming.shtml, (arguing that controlling and censuring police officers
and other public employees, for both on and off duty actions, is justified because they are
held to personal standard higher than other members of the community and highlighting
a few cases of egregious sexual misconduct).
52. 858 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2017).
53. Id. at 305.
54. Id. (quoting the Sheriff’s Code of Conduct “Conduct yourselves at all times in such
a manner as to reflect the high standards of the Bossier Sheriff’s Office . . . [and d]o not
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deputies were accused of violating a provision that required them to
inform their direct supervisor of a change of address within twentyfour hours.55 Both men were given an ultimatum – either cease living
with the woman who was not his wife or be considered to have terminated employment voluntarily.56 The accused refused to comply
and instead filed a suit shortly after the deadline to move out
passed.57
The court relied on its own precedent that has uniformly approved termination of law enforcement officers for sexually inappropriate conduct and refused to accept Lawrence as a reason to mandate
to change policies relevant to public employment.58 In the court’s
opinion, the deputies’ behavior, deemed inappropriate under the
“higher standard,” could besmirch the reputation of the department
or create internal tensions in the force.59 The court found that the
police department was justified in its action on the grounds of preserving a cohesive police force and upholding the public trust and
reputation of the sheriff’s department.60 Once again, Lawrence was
not seen as a definitive authority creating a fundamental right to sexual privacy.61
The right to sexual privacy found its defenders in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Perez v. City of Roseville,62 the court explicitly disagreed with the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits, relying on Lawrence and its own precedent to reaffirm a fundamental right to sexual
privacy.63 The court considered the issue of the degree of “control
the government can force individuals to cede over their private lives
in exchange for the privilege of serving the public by means of public
employment.”64
engage in any illegal, immoral, or indecent conduct, nor engage in any legitimate act which,
when performed in view of the public, would reflect unfavorabl[y] upon the Bossier Sheriff’s Office.”).
55. Id. at 306 (explaining that this measure was designed to ensure the officers’ availability at all times in case of emergencies).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 858 F.3d at 306.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 307 (insisting that relations that go against “legally sanctioned relationships
of marriage and family” will negatively affect public credibility of the force and create
internal tensions within the department).
61. Id. at 306-307 (rejecting, furthermore, reliance on Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution requires the recognition of same-sex marriage, reasoning that “Obergefell does not create ‘rights’ based on
relationships that mock marriage.”)
62. 882 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2018).
63. Id. at 856.
64. Id. at 847 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006)) (reminding other
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Perez, a probationary officer, had a workplace affair with her
fellow officer while both were separated, but not yet divorced from
their spouses.65 The officer’s estranged wife filed a complaint with
Internal Affairs; the following investigation found no evidence of onduty sexual conduct, but did find out that the couple made a number
of calls and texts to each other during work hours, which was found
to “potentially be against” the Department’s policy.66 As a result,
charges of “unsatisfactory work performance” and “conduct unbecoming” and written reprimands were issued to both officers.67
When Perez attended a hearing with the intent to appeal the reprimands, her superior handed her a termination notice that had been
prepared in advance and stated no reasons for discharge.68 The superior later conceded that his moral disapproval of the extramarital
sexual conduct motivated the termination.69 A week later, a new
written reprimand reversed the previous charges and provided a
reason for termination – “use of personal communication devices”
while on duty.70
The Ninth Circuit relied on its own precedent where it held that
an adverse employment action had to be supported by proof of a
“negative impact on job performance or violation of a constitutionally permissible, narrowly drawn regulation.”71 Even absent of
Thorne, the court noted, the decision would have stayed the same in
light of Lawrence, which the court concluded that the freedom to engage in intimate sexual conduct was protected under the Constitution.72
The court’s opinion urged that Lawrence precluded the State
from stigmatizing and punishing for private sexual conduct simply
because society has “‘traditionally viewed a particular practice’… as
immoral.”73 Thus, without a showing of adverse job impact in
courts that “a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen.”)
65. Id. at 848.
66. Id.
67. 882 F.3d at 849.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 849-850.
71. Id. at 848, 855-856 (citing Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir.
1986)). But see Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the right of privacy does not extend to “sexual behavior that is not purely private, that
compromises a police officer’s performance, and that threatens to undermine a police department’s internal morale and community reputation”).
72. Perez, 882 F.3d at 855-856.
73. Id. at 856 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003)) (identifying the failure of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits to truly appreciate the meaning of Lawrence which called
for recognizing intimate sexual conduct as an aspect of the substantive liberty protected
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violation of a narrow, constitutionally valid departmental rule, the
Constitution forbids the police department from expressing its moral
disapproval of Perez’s extramarital affair by terminating her employment on that basis.74 This analysis introduces two new elements to
the reasoning of the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits – showing of an actual negative impact on the employee’s job performance and presence of moral bias, disapproval, or judgment on behalf of the employer.
III. IMPACT OF BIAS OF EXISTENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Terminations of public employees for off-duty intimate conduct
violate both substantive and procedural strands of due process, and
the courts’ lack of attention and cohesion on this subject is troubling.75
To prevail under the doctrine of substantive due process, an employee who believes he had been wrongfully terminated will have to
rely on the court to find sexual privacy to be a fundamental right,
untouchable by the Government absent of a narrowly tailored interest, similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perez.76 This way has
proven to be a point of contention between the Circuit Courts of Appeals, as analyzed below, and can be effectively resolved only in the
Supreme Court.77
From the point of procedural due process, terminations for offduty sexual conduct are difficult for three reasons. First, as illustrated by the circuit split cases, terminations are justified by a loosely
defined and subjectively interpreted moral clauses in the codes of
conduct that do not provide an effective notice as to what conduct
cannot be considered “unbecoming [of] an officer.”78 Second,
by the Due Process Clause).
74. Id. at 855.
75. See Tribe, supra note 40, at 1897 & 1919. See also Nicholas J. Wagoner, Three Reasons
Why Circuit Splits Matter: Due Process, CIRCUIT SPLITS BLOG (Dec. 18, 2011, 5:43 PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20121012094523/http://www.circuitsplits.com/2011/12/3-reasons-why-circuit-splits-matter-due-process-part-3-of3.html (underscoring that lack of cohesion in circuit courts “deprive[s] individuals of an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their behavior accordingly.”).
76. Perez, 882 F.3d at 848. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998)
(specifying that the need for strict scrutiny review against a narrowly tailored governmental regulation is required only where fundamental rights are allegedly infringed).
77. See David W. Garland & Amy B. Messigian, 2018 EMERGING ISSUES 9651, THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYER’S RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE FOR OFF-DUTY CONDUCT (LEXIS
NEXIS 2018).
78. See Sheiring, supra note 20; Shields, supra note 20 (outlining the inconsistencies in
the courts’ interpretations of what does and does not qualify as conduct “unbecoming an
officer” in cases of sexual and non-sexual conduct).
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intimate matters are often subject to personal biases and moral judgments, and if the termination was even in part motivated by those,
the requirement of having a fair hearing by an unbiased tribunal can
hardly be satisfied.79 Third, in the absence of a readily apparent negative impact on the job performance, the investigation required to
gather the evidence of such impact could constitute a violation of the
employee’s privacy, especially in cases of intimate relationships and
preferences.80 Therefore, the employees’ constitutional protections
and the employers’ interest in controlling their workforce have to be
reconciled in an effective and constitutionally appropriate framework.
A. Impact of Bias on Creation of Fundamental Rights and
Substantive Due Process
Part of the legal community maintains that the Lawrence language left a lot to interpretation, and it will take another trip to the
Supreme Court to settle once and for all whether the fundamental
right to sexual privacy has a place in the context of substantive due
process.81 At the same time, the Court did explicitly criticize the reliance of the constitutional analysis on tradition and history and
called for removal of moral judgment from the equation.82 The fact
that the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits refused to adjust their analysis
accordingly led the Ninth Circuit to issue a ruling that stands in direct conflict with their opinions – and explicitly calls them out for
failure to appreciate the impact of Lawrence.83
i. Historical Bias Stands in the Way of New Fundamental
Rights
Before Lawrence, and under Glucksberg, the Supreme Court
would have begun the constitutional analysis by asking whether
79. See Friendly, supra note 4 (questioning how much prior participation can constitute bias but nonetheless highlighting that an unbiased tribunal is a necessary element in
every hearing).
80. See Dunnington v. Dep’t of Justice, 956 F.2d 1151, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Obviously, the best evidence of reasonable cause will be that determined by the agency after an
appropriate investigation of the facts and circumstances of the alleged misconduct.”)
81. See Garland, supra note 7; Terpstra, supra note 7, at 1129-32.
82. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003). See Herald, supra note 23, at 28
(applying the new framework to the case of prohibiting the sale of sex-toys and highlighting the differences in the analysis).
83. See United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (pledging
that the Ninth Circuit avoids creating conflict with other circuits absent a strong reason to
do so).
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there was a tradition and history of protecting intimate sexual conduct.84 According to Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, the discussion
should instead focus on whether the government has any reason,
other than moral disapproval, for policing consenting adults in their
legal, private bedroom activities, like illegality.85
The opinions in both Coker and Seegmiller, in their disagreement
with Lawrence, failed to consider the fact that adultery, while deemed
to be socially undesirable and immoral, is also the kind of crime or
misdemeanor that does not often get enforced – similar to sodomy at
the time of the Lawrence decision.86 While adultery is still left unrepealed in the official codes, there have been calls for its decriminalization.87 Absent of intent to punish for an illegal activity, the motivation behind the terminations and the courts’ decisions seems to be
based on personal bias and prejudice against divorcing or allegedly
adulterous spouses.
Even if Lawrence is read narrowly, as limited to consensual acts
between adults who practice safe sexual activities in private, the conduct by the officers in both Coker and Seegmiller would still fit within
the general parameters of protected conduct.88 All of the officers
84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“History and tradition are the starting point but
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”) See also Herald,
supra note 23 at 12 (highlighting Justice Kennedy’s criticism of the approach even though
he never directly calls out Glucksberg for its dependence on the alleged significance of the
historical inquiry).
85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (emphasizing the fact the number of states prohibiting sodomy was, at the time, decreasing, and even those that still had them on the
books, exhibited “a pattern of non-enforcement” with respect to the activities consenting
adults engage in privately). See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000).
86. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 512 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It would be
absurd to pretend that all criminal statutes are adequately enforced.”). See also Ethan
Bronner, Adultery, an Ancient Crime that Remains on Many Books, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/us/adultery-an-ancient-crime-still-on-manybooks.html (demonstrating that adultery is considered a criminal offense in twenty states,
and the United States is one of the last industrialized countries to criminalize extra-marital
affairs, but prosecutions are extremely rare, leaving the statutes with a purely symbolic
status).
87. See MODEL PENAL CODE §207.1 Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955) (recommending that adultery be decriminalized). See also Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restriction on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1660, 1676-78 (discussing the
long history of adultery statutes and pointing out that while adultery is often still viewed
as morally wrong, the legal scholars condemn state intervention).
88. But see Kristine Phillips, He Was arrested For a Sex Act That’s No Longer a Crime,
Years Later, He Remains Convicted, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/02/15/he-was-convicted-of-a-sex-act-thatsno-longer-a-crime-years-later-hes-deemed-a-sex-offender/ (reporting on a story of a man
whose appeal to the sodomy conviction was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit based on a
hypertechnical reading of Lawrence that only protected private acts, thus affirming his
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were adults, either separated or pending divorce proceedings, who
engaged in consensual relationships with their new partners.89 On
its face, the conduct appears to be of the kind that Lawrence intended
to shield from undue government intrusion and judgment.90 It is
worth noting that Perez, who was still married but separated from
her ex-husband, was involved with a co-worker, which is arguably a
more publicly-condemned affair that often goes against anti-fraternization policies.91 Regardless of that fact, the Ninth Circuit still
found her conduct to be protected, both under its own precedent and
Lawrence.92 For future cases, courts should rely on the Perez decision
and draw an appropriate line before intruding on private conduct
that Lawrence meant to protect.
One of the most important propositions that Lawrence stands for
is the assertion that the Constitution places limits on the State’s right
to interfere with the person’s most basic decisions about family and
parenthood by the means of making private sexual conduct a crime.93
In both Coker and Seegmiller, the officers had already made the decision to separate from their previous spouses, by either privately
agreeing to a separation or a divorce.94 Those actions and any following actions are of a deeply personal nature, so the sheriff’s ultimatum in Coker to either stop non-marital cohabitation or be terminated goes beyond the limitation imposed by Lawrence.95 Similarly,
a reprimand issued to Johnson in Seegmiller, that was based on a false
accusation and caused Johnson to lose her SWAT membership and
her job, also constituted undue interference.96 In both cases, the
courts justified their decisions by refusing to extend the Lawrence
protections to the conduct they deemed to be immoral, going against
the Supreme Court’s directive.
ii. Hiding Personal Bias Behind Vague Governmental
conviction for having consensual sex with three women of the age of consent in a hotel
room which was deemed public space for the purpose of the proceedings). See generally
Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2017); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d
762 (10th Cir. 2008).
89. Coker, 858 F.3d at 305; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 764-765.
90. See Herald, supra note 23, at 3 (suggesting that sexual morality regulation has been
eliminated after Lawrence).
91. Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 2018). See generally Michael J.
Bulzomi, CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE OFF-DUTY RELATIONSHIPS: RECENT
COURT DECISIONS, 68 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 26 (1999).
92. Perez, 882 F.3d 843 at 848.
93. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (emphasizing that such interference
could give the State the ability to control the destiny of its citizens).
94. Coker, 858 F.3d at 305; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 764-765.
95. Coker, 858 F.3d at 306.
96. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 766.
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Codes of Conduct
Cases where personal judgments become those of a state, by virtue of being delivered via government agents, are in direct conflict
with the Lawrence reasoning.97 Public employers’ actions are legally
viewed as the actions of the state, including decisions made in regard
to matters of employment.98 Therefore, when the Ninth Circuit
equated the police chief’s expressed prejudice against Perez’s intimate life with a prejudiced state action and condemned basing a termination decision on that prejudice, it correctly followed the Lawrence rationale.99
The courts in Coker and Seegmiller did not take the prejudice into
account and failed to consider whether the punishment – termination
from a job that requires years of training – matched the “crime” of
having a complicated personal life.100 Notably, none of the cases state
that the codes of conduct had specific provisions that would make
adultery a termination-worthy offense; instead, the officers had to
imply that it would fall within the scope of generally condemned immoral conduct.
The courts further allowed the firing officers to hide their biases
behind regulations that were only tangentially related to the conduct
in question, like failure to notify the superiors about a new home address or allegedly negatively impacting the department’s reputation.101 For example, the Coker court did not attend to that the sheriff
ordered his deputies to “cease living with a woman not his spouse,”
not update their address in accordance with the department’s rule
that they had violated.102 The glaring discrepancy between what the
officers were being accused of and what the sheriff was attempting
to enforce underscores that the sheriff cared more about the deputies
97. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-79. See also NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192
(1988) (designing an inquiry into whether the state provided a mantle of authority that
enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor which determines whether the
action was performed on behalf of the state).
98. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (inquiring whether the
action taken can be fairly attributed to the state itself).
99. Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 856 (9th Cir. 2018) (precluding the Department from expressing its moral disapproval of Perez’s extramarital affair by terminating
her employment on that basis explicitly because Lawrence explicitly forbade the State to
stigmatize sexual conduct, even if it has been traditionally held immoral).
100. See Due Process Rights for Law Enforcement Officers, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
https://www.fop.net/CmsPage.aspx?id=97 (last visited March 10, 2019) (noting that former law enforcement officers find it is nearly impossible to new employment in public
safety once their reputation is tarnished by an accusation).
101. Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2017); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City,
528 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2008).
102. Coker, 858 F.3d at 306.
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living with their spouses rather than having their correct addresses
in case of an emergency. Absent of a work-related reason for the ultimatum, it is plausible to suggest that the termination was, at least
in part, motivated by the sheriff’s personal bias against the unconventional living arrangements.103
Overall, both Coker and Seegmiller, even in the absence of a clear
language on existence of the fundamental right to privacy, failed to
appreciate another piece of the Lawrence opinion that specifically
suggested steering away from relying on history, tradition, and
moral judgment to even consider the creation of a fundamental
right.104 As Justice Kennedy explained in Lawrence, the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause must extend equally to all intimate
sexual conduct between consenting adults, regardless of whether
they are of the same sex or of their marital status.105 This non-uniformity further highlights the issue of vague codes of conducts, the
subjective interpretation of which leads to vastly different results in
different jurisdictions.106
iii.

Substituting Legitimate Government Interest for
Bias

Another vague suggestion to come out of Lawrence concerns the
level of scrutiny applicable to cases involving the right to sexual privacy.107 Without explicitly calling the right fundamental, the Court
did not have the basis to demand strict scrutiny, which led to the
circuits in this split applying different standards based either on their
own precedent or their interpretation of the Supreme Court’s opinion.108 Typically, the Court applies heightened scrutiny once the
103. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (warning against subjective enforcement of laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations by government officials).
104. Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 856 (9th Cir. 2018) (Emphasis added).
105. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-579 (2003).
106. See Reiter, supra note 59. See also Sheiring, supra note 20; Shields, supra note 20
(providing a comprehensive overview of inconsistencies in the courts’ interpretations of
what does and does not qualify as conduct “unbecoming an officer” in cases of sexual and
non-sexual conduct).
107. See Yoshino, supra note 14 (describing “rationality with a bite” and arguing that
Lawrence can be read as an example of it, even though the Court never explicitly acknowledged such standard).
108. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (specifying that the
need for strict scrutiny review against a narrowly tailored governmental regulation is only
required where fundamental rights are allegedly infringed). Compare Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying rational basis), and Seegmiller v. LaVerkin
City, 528 F.3d 762, 771-72 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying rational basis), with Perez v. City of
Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 855 (9th Cir. 2018) (insisting on heightened security).
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Court discerns the presence of actual animus, and some scholars
have questioned why the Court did not see it fit to clearly spell it out
in Lawrence.109 Unequivocal application of the strict scrutiny standard would help the courts analyze the cases similar to the ones discussed in this Comment, where animus against non-traditional sexual preferences, extra-marital affairs, or separations is more than
apparent, and sometimes was explicit in the facts of the cases, such
as the Chief’s admission of personal bias in Perez.110
In the absence of a regulation or a code provision within the City
of Roseville Police Department that was narrowly tailored to its specific interest, as well as uncontested facts about the affair itself and
its impact on her job performance, firing Perez violated the Constitution.111 The police department would have had to expressly articulate constitutionally-defensible policy concerning the officer’s offduty conduct if it wished to rely on such grounds for termination.
By contrast, the Sheriff’s Department in Coker did cite a provision in the law enforcement that required the deputies to inform their
direct supervisors of a change of address within twenty-four
hours.112 On its face, the measure served a valid purpose of ensuring
the deputies availability in cases of emergencies.113 However, the ultimatum given by the Sheriff did not serve to remedy the mere lack
of a new address, it was targeting the very fact that the deputies cohabitated with women who were not their wives.114 Merely citing a
valid regulation as a reason for termination is not a cure for an unconstitutional termination.115 The court in Perez placed little value on
the fact that the police department remanded the charges and issued
a new termination notice, adding the use of personal communication
devices as the sole charge, seeing through the department’s attempt
to cover up the bias.116
Other than the change of address provision, the Sheriff offered
a number of other reasons to uphold the reprimand.117 The court,
109. See Yoshino, supra note 14.
110. Perez, 882 F.3d 843, 854 (9th Cir. 2018).
111. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (holding that under
heightened scrutiny, the action is deemed unconstitutional unless there is a regulation tailored to a specific government interest). See also Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843,
854 (9th Cir. 2018).
112. Coker, 858 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2017).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Doe v. Dep’t of Justice, 565 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
116. Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 2018).
117. Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 306-307 (5th Cir. 2017) (suggesting that the
new living arrangements had the potential to besmirch the reputation of the department,
create internal tension in the force, or be used adversely in litigation concerning the official
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however, failed to recognize that not a single argument was based
on an actual negative impact brought on by the deputies’ private actions; instead they were all general hypotheticals.118
The state of one’s marriage or its arrangement, therefore, falls
outside of government control and cannot be subject to an adverse
employment action even on the basis of a poorly articulated government objective, let alone personal disapproval by one’s superiors.
Furthermore, the judges have to be able to see past those biases, acting as a safeguard against morally-charged regulations.
B. Impact of Bias and Moral Judgment on the Procedural Due
Process
The procedural strand presents a new host of issues, separate
from the substantive piece discussed above.119 Public employers are
in a different position from the private market because many aspects
of their employment are subject to the protections of Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses.120 While there were cases that explicitly
held that public employees shed some of the constitutional protections guaranteed to the general public in exchange for the privilege
of serving in a public role, the right to due process for government
employees is undeniable.121
i. Clash Between Privacy and Government Interest in Due
Process Proceedings
The police departments, like any other employer, have an interest in preventing their employees from engaging in behaviors that
conduct of the deputies).
118. See Pope v. United States Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (requiring evidence of nexus between the conduct and the efficiency of service). See also Warren v. State Personnel Bd., 94 Cal. App. 3d 95, 105-06 (Ct. App. 1979) (agreeing that dismissal cannot be based on lawful sexual acts conducted off-duty – like attending a
transvestite party – but still upholding the termination because the activity in question
allegedly “cast discredit” upon the officer, his agency, and law enforcement in general).
119. See generally Sarah E. Suszczyk, Procedural Due Process Rights for Public Employees,
2018 Annual Lab. & Emp. Law Conference, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2018/AnnualConference/papers/Procedural%20Due%20Process%20Rights%20for%20Public%20Employees.pdf.
120. See Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972). But see Sonne, supra note
5 (arguing that policies allowing monitoring off-duty conduct and using it as basis for adverse employment decisions are a sensible option for modern day employment relationships, and any shortcoming can be better addressed by the market and not jurisprudence).
121. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (noting, however, that a public
employee is still a citizen entitled to expect certain Constitutional protections when he is
not acting in his official governmental capacity). See also Suszczyk, supra note 119.
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could have a negative impact on the quality of work performed.122
However, this interest has to be balanced against the employees’ interest in keeping their private lives private and not suffer from jobrelated consequences caused by non-job-related conduct.123
Procedural due process requires the employer to present evidence that has led to the determination that an adverse employment
action (reprimand or termination) is warranted.124 If, as discussed
earlier, one’s moral disapproval of off-duty sexual conduct is not a
sufficient basis, the burden is on the employer to show that the offduty conduct had negative impact on the job performance.125 The
police departments in Perez, Coker, and Seegmiller were informed of
the off-duty conduct by third parties, but they still had to find a way
to tie it to on-duty performance to justify undertaking adverse employment actions, which is typically done through internal investigations.
The required investigation to determine whether off-duty sexual conduct has an adverse impact on one’s job performance, depending on its intrusiveness, could constitute governmental invasion that “shocks the conscience” by itself, regardless of whether the
investigation is followed by a termination.126 Absent of details on the
record, consider how intrusive the investigation in Perez could have
been: asking personal questions about the state of marriage, intimate
encounters, personal texts and schedules – all in the absence of an
apparent negative impact on her job.127 There is, therefore, a need for
limits on the scope and reach of such investigations in order to ensure further protections of a fundamental right to sexual privacy.

122. See Sugarman, supra note 17 at 382-83 (stating that while it is generally accepted
that employers look to protect and advance their legitimate financial interests, personal
values of management may also be considered in employment decisions in the context of
non-profit groups or family-owned firms). See also Singer, supra note 15 (questioning over
the scope of the employer’s power to regulate off-duty conduct of government employees
by imposing its own moral standards).
123. See James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
220 (1890) (“[A] man’s house is his castle.”).
124. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929-930 (1997). See generally Friendly, supra note
4 (noting that a proposed action has to be based on clearly asserted legitimate grounds).
125. See Doe v. Dep’t of Justice, 565 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (The agency bears
the burden of proof to establish this nexus.).
126. See generally Pope v. United States Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (tasking the government with the burden of proving with preponderance of evidence that the alleged conduct indeed occurred and had impact on the employee’s job
performance).
127. Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 2018).

60

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21.1

ii. Imbalance of Power and Lack of Fair Hearing
While there is no definitive list of the mandatory procedures
that due process requires, at the core of the procedural due process
is the right to an unbiased tribunal, where the employee is able to
present a response to the charges.128 The court in Perez was faced
with the most egregious violation of the procedural due process:
when officer Perez attended the appeal hearing, she was handed a
termination notice drafted even before the hearing began, depriving
Perez of an opportunity to present her response to the charges.129 The
deputies in Coker found themselves in a similar position when they
were placed on administrative leave without a hearing and later presented with an ultimatum by their direct supervisor.130
Clearly, a biased supervisor does not make a fair tribunal, especially when it is the same person who interprets the code of conduct,
calls for an employment action, and carries out the reprimand or the
termination. While this would not become an issue for private atwill employment, the government, just like its employees, is to be
held to a higher standard.131
IV. CLEARING UP THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY BY GETTING RID
OF THE VAGUENESS, BIAS, AND STIGMA
The lack of due process in this aspect of public employment has
to be addressed promptly. As it touches on both strands of due process, two solutions can be proposed.
From the standpoint of procedural due process, and in line with
Perez, this Comment does not suggest that the mere claim that the
sexual conduct is private should create an impenetrable legal wall
between the privacy and the employer’s ability to fire an employee.
Rather, it advocates for stronger protections that will allow the employees to avoid being fired for mere moral disapproval of their private conduct and sexual practices.
The investigations into the alleged transgressions should be motivated by an apparent detriment to the quality of work, not personal
bias of the employer.132 A preliminary inquiry into the motivation
128. See Friendly, supra note 4, at 1279 (listing it as the first, fundamental, elements of
a fair hearing pursuant to the requirements of due process). See id. at 1280-81 (stating that
an opportunity to present reasons why a proposed action should not be taken is crucial
and contemplating whether oral presentation is sufficient or universally accepted).
129. Perez, 882 F.3d 843, 849 (9th Cir. 2018).
130. Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 305-306 (5th Cir. 2017).
131. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
132. See Pope v. United States Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
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and legitimate basis of the disciplinary action will allow to separate
those employees whose conduct actually impaired the quality of
their performance from those who just want to protect their autonomy and engage in private and lawful sexual activities.133 To assist
with legitimacy of these inquiries, the disciplinary action should be
based on a clearly articulated clause of the internal rules, not a morality clause that lacks specific language as to the unwanted conduct
and its consequences.134 Those regulations will serve as efficient notice to the employees of the types of conduct that could constitute a
basis for an adverse employment action, satisfying the requirements
of procedural due process.
Ensuring a clear pathway through procedural due process requires a lot of moving pieces, including revising regulations and implementing additional hearings, which can prove to be logistically
difficult, considering the amount of various state and federal agencies. The most efficient solution would require the Supreme Court
to definitively decide, one way or another, whether there is a fundamental right to sexual privacy, thus enabling the substantive due
process protections. Issuing such a decision will provide lower
courts with a consistent standard that will eliminate the uncertainty
on whether constitutional protections are available for any kinds of
legal sexual conduct.
The only degree of certainty that exists right now is the liberal
or conservative leaning of the court, as illustrated by the circuit split
discussed above. Judge Reinhardt, a known “liberal bad boy,” was
expected to give a liberal ruling on a case like Perez.135
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Perez provides a bright line rule
that is easy to follow by expressly adopting the broad reading on
Lawrence: “[T]he constitutional guarantees of privacy and free association prohibit the State from taking adverse employment action on
the basis of private sexual conduct unless it demonstrates that such
conduct negatively affects on-the-job performance or violates a

(requiring evidence of nexus between the conduct and the efficiency of service).
133. See Singer, supra note 15 (suggesting that the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) and the Federal Circuit engage in a preliminary inquiry before taking an adverse
employment action against an employee whose conduct allegedly led to decline in efficiency of service).
134. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972) (voiding unconstitutionally vague laws and regulations).
135. Sam Roberts, Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of Federal Court, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/obituaries/stephen-reinhardtliberal-lion-of-federal-court-dies-at-87.html (praising the judge, who, despite having a disproportionate number of his decisions reversed by the Supreme Court, was widely commended for his principled, but often unpredictable decisions).

62

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21.1

constitutionally permissible, narrowly tailored regulation.”136
Establishing a blanket fundamental right to sexual privacy
would eliminate the need for guesswork on whether the conduct is
covered and allow the law to evolve in tandem with society.137 As a
matter of law, defining a fundamental right in sexual privacy will
clear up the confusion over the meaning of Lawrence and prevent
new plaintiffs from coming to the courts in hope of clarifying
whether a particular intimate activity deserves constitutional protections in cases of bias-driven terminations. As a matter of public policy, it would allow consenting adults of various marriage statuses,
sexual orientations, and preferences to engage in private, off-duty,
intimate conduct of their choice and be free from adverse employment actions by their public employers.
As warned by Judge Reinhardt, we “should be careful not to allow the State to use its authority as an employer to encroach excessively or unnecessarily upon the areas of private life.”138
V. CONCLUSION
Even though Lawrence may not explicitly create the right to sexual privacy, it does not explicitly deny it, and until the Supreme
Court sees it fit to clarify this question, public employees are left defending their off-duty intimate activity in front of the courts with
drastically different frameworks.139
The broad interpretation of Lawrence in Perez,140 if accepted by
the Supreme Court, will ensure that a fundamental right to sexual
privacy is recognized and respected by the lower courts. Among
many other implications of such a decision, the public employees
will have an avenue to pursue a legal action for wrongful termination based on disapproval of their private conduct instead of real detriment to their job performance.

136. Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 2018) (Citing Lawrence v.
Texas, 882 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 2018)).
137. See Herald, supra note 23 (noting that so far, the constitutional right to privacy
required one to seek judicial approval to update the ever-expanding list of activities that
deserve constitutional recognition and protection – a long and difficult process).
138. Perez, 882 F.3d at 847 (9th Cir. 2018).
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
140. Perez, 882 F.3d at 847 (9th Cir. 2018).

